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We introduce the heterogeneous voter model (HVM), in which each agent has its own intrinsic rate
to change state, reflective of the heterogeneity of real people, and the partisan voter model (PVM),
in which each agent has an innate and fixed preference for one of two possible opinion states. For
the HVM, the time until consensus is reached is much longer than in the classic voter model. For
the PVM in the mean-field limit, a population evolves to a preference-based state, where each
agent tends to be aligned with its internal preference. For finite populations, discrete fluctuations
ultimately lead to consensus being reached in a time that scales exponentially with population size.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.40.-a, 89.75.Fb
The paradigmatic voter model [1] describes the evo-
lution toward consensus in a population of agents that
possess a discrete set of opinions. In a single update, a
random voter is picked and it adopts the opinion state
of a randomly-selected neighbor. By repeated updates, a
finite and initially diverse population necessarily reaches
consensus in a time that typically scales as a power law
of the population size N [1, 2]. In many respects, the
voter model resembles the kinetic Ising model with zero-
temperature Glauber dynamics. Because of this connec-
tion to non-equilibrium spin systems [3] and the utility of
the voter model for interacting particle [1] and social [4]
systems, the voter model is widely-studied in the physics
literature (see e.g., [5–8]). In this work, we generalize the
traditional voter model in two simple, but far-reaching
ways to incorporate the heterogeneity of real people [9]:
• Heterogeneous voter model (HVM): each voter has
an intrinsic and distinct “flip” rate.
• Partisan voter model (PVM): each voter has an in-
nate and fixed preference for one opinion state.
The role of heterogeneity was emphasized in classic
work by Granovetter [10], in which collective social be-
havior is determined by the diversity of individual thresh-
olds to act in response to stimuli. In the context of
the voter model, heterogeneity has been studied in the
extreme situation where some voters are “zealots” that
never change opinion [11, 12]. This attribute prevents
consensus from being reached when zealots with differ-
ent opinions exist. In our HVM, the flip rate of each
agent is taken from a continuous distribution that ex-
cludes zero. Since every voter can, in principle, change
state, a finite system necessarily reaches consensus, al-
beit slowly. For the PVM, the innate voting preference
of each agent leads to a collective state in which the opin-
ion of each voter tends to align with its own preference.
This competition between self-interest and consensus has
been modeled previously [13], and was the focus of recent
social experiments that attempted to elucidate the role
of the preference strength on the dynamics [14]. Here we
investigate basic properties of these two models from a
statistical physics perspective.
Heterogeneous Voter Model (HVM): Each agent can be
in one of two opinion states that we label as 0 and 1.
We first determine the exit probability E(ρ) that a fi-
nite population with initial density ρ of 1 voters ends
with 1 consensus. Because the average density ρ of 1
voters is conserved for the classic voter model on regular
networks [1], the final density of 1 voters, which equals
0× (1−E(ρ)) + 1×E(ρ) = E(ρ), must equal the initial
density ρ.
To derive the exit probability for the HVM, we need to
construct an analogous conservation law. Let η(x) = 0, 1
denote the state of a voter at node x in a social network,
η the state of all voters in the system, and ηx the system
state derived from η when only the voter at x flips. The
transition probability of a voter at node x is given by
P[η → ηx] =
∑
y
rx
Nk
[Φ(x, y) + Φ(y, x)], (1)
where y are the neighbors of node x, rx is the intrin-
sic flip rate of the voter at x, and k is the number of
neighbors of each node in a regular network. The factor
Φ(x, y) ≡ η(x)[1 − η(y)] guarantees that voters at x and
y have different opinions so that an update actually oc-
curs. The transition probability (1) corresponds to the
invasion process on a heterogeneous network (see Eqs. (4)
and (5) in [8]), in which a randomly-selected agent im-
poses its state on a neighbor; in the complementary voter
model the agent imports the state of a neighbor.
The average change in η(x) equals the difference be-
tween the probabilities that η(x) changes from 0 to 1
and from 1 to 0. Thus 〈∆η(x)〉 = [1− 2η(x)]P[η → ηx].
Using the transition rate (1), it is immediate to see that
2102 103 104N
101
103
105
107
109
〈T N
〉
CG α=0
ring α=0
CG α=1/2
ring α=1/2
FIG. 1: Average consensus time 〈TN〉 for 10
4 realizations of
the HVM on: (a) a complete graph (CG) of N nodes (open
symbols), and (b) ring ofN nodes (filled symbols), with circles
and triangles corresponding to α = 0 and 1
2
. The solid lines
are power-law data fits, with slopes 2.03 for the CG and 2.98
for the ring, compared to the values 2 and 3 from theory
(Eq. (5) and immediately after Eq. (8)). The dashed lines
are the exact results for the homogeneous voter model: (a)
TN = N ln 2 on the CG and (b) TN ∼ N
2 on the ring.
the factor rx leads to 〈η(x)〉 not being conserved. By con-
struction, however, the rate-weighted density of 1 voters,
ω ≡
∑
x η(x)/rx∑
x 1/rx
, (2)
is conserved in the HVM. Thus the probability for a sys-
tem with initial value ω to reach 1 consensus equals ω.
As a consequence, a tiny fraction of very stubborn 1 vot-
ers (those with flip rates r ≪ 1) leads to a probability of
reaching 1 consensus that is arbitrarily close to one.
To determine the average consensus time 〈TN〉 for
a population of N heterogeneous voters, we focus on
the distribution of intrinsic rates p(r) = Ar−α, with
r ∈ (0, r+] and α in the range [0, 1) so the distribution is
normalizable. For convenience in comparing cases with
different α, we fix the average flip rate of the entire pop-
ulation 〈r〉 = 1. These conditions give r+ =
2−α
1−α and
A = (2 − α)rα−2+ . Although the lower limit of the flip
rate distribution is zero, the smallest rate r− among a fi-
nite population of N voters is non-zero and is determined
by the extremal criterion [15]∫ r
−
0
Ar−α dr = N−1 , (3)
which gives r− ∼ N
−1/(1−α). As we shall see, these stub-
bornest voters control the consensus time.
We take the initial condition that each voter is inde-
pendently in the 0 or the 1 state with probability 12 . For
voters on a complete graph of N ≫ 1 nodes, we now fol-
low the analysis of the closely-related invasion process on
heterogeneous networks [8]. We partition voters accord-
ing to their flip rates and denote by ρr the density of 1
voters that have flip rate in the range [r, r + ∆r]. The
evolution of ρr is governed by a Fokker-Planck equation
whose drift velocity drives each of the densities ρr to the
common value ρ in a convergence time scale that is of the
order of 1/r. Subsequently ρ evolves in the same manner
as the homogeneous voter model on the complete graph
with an effective population size Neff = N〈1/r〉. Be-
cause the consensus time of the classic voter model on
the complete graph is proportional to this effective size,
we obtain, for the HVM:
〈TN〉 ∼ N〈1/r〉 . (4)
Heterogeneity hinders the approach to consensus be-
cause 〈1/r〉 > 1/〈r〉. The dependence of Eq. (4) arises
because a voter with flip rate r effectively corresponds to
1/r voters with flip rate 1. For the power-law distribu-
tion of flip rates p(r) = Ar−α, Eq. (4), in conjunction
with r− ∼ N
−1/(1−α), yields 〈1/r〉 ∼ Nα/(1−α). Thus
〈TN 〉 ∼
{
N lnN α = 0 ,
N1/(1−α) 0 < α < 1 ,
(5)
in agreement with simulation results (Fig. 1). Notice
that the convergence time for the stubbornest voters,
1/r− ∼ N
1/(1−α), is of the same order as the consensus
time; evidently, this subtlety does not affect our simula-
tion results. Finally, if the lower limit of the distribution
of flip rates is strictly greater than zero, then the mean
consensus time is linear in N .
In one dimension, the HVM organizes into alternating
domains of like-minded voters at long times, and con-
sensus is reached when all the intervening (and mobile)
domain walls annihilate. This complete annihilation oc-
curs when a single domain wall explores on the order of
N nodes. Thus consider the motion of a single domain
wall between nodes i−1 and i— all voters to the left of i
are in state 0 and all other voters are in state 1. In a time
interval dt, the probabilities that this domain wall hops
one step to the right and to the left are, respectively,
pi = ri∆t , qi = ri−1∆t . (6)
The crucial point is that hopping probabilities at adja-
cent nodes are anti-correlated — if the bias at node i
is to the right (corresponding to ri > ri−1), then it is
more likely that ri+1 < ri and the bias at node i + 1
will be to the left. More precisely, for three consecutive
rates (ri−1, ri, ri+1) with the constraint ri > ri−1, their
relative sizes may equiprobably be SML, SLM, or MLS,
where S, M, L denotes the smallest, middle, and largest
of these three rates. The latter two cases correspond to
a leftward bias between nodes i and i + 1, which thus
occurs with probability 2/3.
With the hopping probabilities qi and pi, the mean
first-passage time τ for a particle to travel from i = 0 to
3i = N in the finite interval [0, N ] is known [16–18]:
τ =
N−1∑
k=0
1
pk
+
N−2∑
k=0
1
pk
N−1∑
i=k+1
i∏
j=k+1
qj
pj
. (7)
In the Sinai problem [19], where the pi and qi are indepen-
dent, identically-distributed random variables, τ grows as
eN [16]. For the HVM, the anti-correlated hopping prob-
abilities (6) lead to substantial cancellations in the above
product and yields
τ = N
〈
1
r
〉
+
(N − 1)N
2
〈
1
r
〉
. (8)
Using our previous result for 〈1/r〉, we thus obtain
〈TN 〉 ∼ N
2+α/(1−α), which agrees well with our numeri-
cal simulations shown in Fig. 1(b).
Partisan Voter Model (PVM): Without being pejorative,
define state 1 as “democrat” and state 0 as “republican”.
In the PVM, each voter has a fixed and innate preference
for democrat or republican. Equivalently, each voter ex-
periences its own random field. A voter can therefore
exist in one of four states: a “concordant democrat” is a
democratic voter in its preferred 1 state, while “discor-
dant democrat” is a democratic voter that happens to
be in the 0 state. Complementary definitions apply for
“concordant republican” and “discordant republican”.
Denote the densities of these four types of voters as
Dc, Dd, Rc, and Rd, respectively. The density of voters
ρ that happen to be in the 1 state (current democrats)
is ρ = Dc + Rd. In a single update event, a voter in
a social network is randomly selected and it selects a
random neighbor. If these two voters are in the same
state, nothing happens. If the pair is in different opinion
states, the initial voter changes its state as follows:
• if the voter becomes aligned with its preference, the
change occurs at rate 1 + ǫ;
• if the voter becomes anti-aligned with its prefer-
ence, the change occurs at rate 1− ǫ.
Thus ǫ quantifies the strength of the intrinsic preference,
or partisanship. If ǫ = 1, each voter becomes a zealot
that never changes opinion after aligning with its innate
preference, while ǫ = 0 recovers the classic voter model.
A similar dichotomous rate arises for catalysis on a dis-
ordered surface [20], where surface heterogeneity controls
the adsorption rate of different reactants on the surface.
By analyzing the outcomes from all possible pairs of
opposite-opinion voters, the rate equations for the densi-
ties Dc and Dd in the mean-field limit are:
D˙c = 2ǫDcDd + (1 + ǫ)DdRd − (1− ǫ)DcRc ,
D˙d = −2ǫDcDd + (1− ǫ)DcRc − (1 + ǫ)DdRd .
(9)
The equations for Rc and Rd are obtained from (9) by
interchanging R↔ D. Note that D˙c+D˙d = R˙c+R˙d = 0,
which expresses the conservation of voters of any type.
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FIG. 2: Flow diagram (schematic) in the physical portion of
the ∆-Σ phase plane (inside square). The open circles denote
the fixed (saddle) points that correspond to consensus (C),
while the filled dot denotes the (stable) self-centered fixed
point (S). The small arrows on either side of the nullclines
∆˙ = 0 and Σ˙ = 0 (dashed) indicate the local flow of ∆ or Σ.
Let D and R denote the density of intrinsic democrats
and republicans, respectively. For simplicity, we special-
ize to the symmetric case of D = R = 12 , so that the den-
sity of democrats of any kind, concordant and discordant,
is given by Dc +Dd = D =
1
2 ; similarly, Rc + Rd =
1
2 .
Using these relations, ρ = Dc+
1
2 −Rc ≡
1
2+∆. In terms
of the sum Σ ≡ Dc +Rc and the difference ∆ ≡ Dc −Rc
in the densities of concordant voters, Eqs. (9) simplify to
∆˙ = ǫ∆− 2ǫΣ∆ ,
Σ˙ = 12 (1 + ǫ)− Σ− 2ǫ∆
2 .
(10)
For ǫ = 0 (classic voter model), ∆˙ = ρ˙ = 0, and the
average density of voters in either opinion state is con-
served. Because Σ˙ = 12 (1−2Σ), the density of concordant
voters is driven to 12 in the final consensus state. For gen-
eral 0 < ǫ < 1, there are two fixed points (Fig. 2):
• Self-centered (S): ∆∗ = 0 and Σ∗ = 12 (1 + ǫ). Each
voter tends to internal concordance at the expense
of consensus.
• Consensus (C): ∆∗ = ± 12 and Σ
∗ = 12 . One half of
all the voters are intrinsically concordant.
To infer the global flow in the ∆-Σ plane, we determine
the nullclines ∆˙ = 0 and Σ˙ = 0 (given by Σ = 12 and Σ =
1
2 (1 + ǫ) − 2ǫ∆
2, respectively), and study the linearized
rate equations about each fixed point. Both eigenvalues
are negative at the self-centered fixed point S, while the
eigenvalues have different signs at the consensus fixed
points C. Thus if voters have innate preferences, small
deviations from the consensus fixed points will grow and
the population will be driven to the S fixed point, where
each agent tends to align with its innate preference. As
the partisanship strength ǫ increases, each individual is
more likely to be aligned with its innate preference, but
with a concomitant lack of consensus.
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FIG. 3: State of the PVM in one dimension. The letters D
and R denote the intrinsic preference of each voter, while the
current state of the voters is given the string of 0s and 1s. A
single domain wall is shown by the dashed line and the bias
that it experiences is indicated by the arrows.
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FIG. 4: Average consensus time 〈TN〉 versus number of voters
N for the PVM on: (a) the complete graph (open symbols)
and (b) a ring (filled symbols). The circles and triangles are
simulation data for 10000 realizations with ǫ = 0.05 and 0.15,
respectively. The lines are guides to the eye.
For a finite system, however, the only true fixed points
of the stochastic dynamics of the PVM are those that cor-
respond to consensus. Since the flow in the ∆-Σ phase
plane is driven away from these fixed points, the time to
reach consensus should scale exponentially in the popu-
lation size. We can understand this behavior easily in
one dimension because now the dynamics of single do-
main walls map exactly to the motion of a particle in a
random potential (the Sinai model [19]). As illustrated
in Fig. 3, strings of consecutive democrats or republicans
give rise to potential barriers that domain walls have to
surmount to annihilate each other and allow the system
to reach consensus. In a system of length N , the mean
time for a domain wall to move a distance N therefore
scales as eN [16–19]. Numerical simulations of the PVM
on the complete graph and on the one-dimensional peri-
odic lattice (Fig. 4) are consistent with this prediction.
We also checked that qualitatively similar behavior arises
when the PVM is generalized to allow for heterogeneity
in the flip rate of each voter.
To summarize, we extended the voter model to incor-
porate the realistic features of heterogeneity and par-
tisanship. Both generalizations are characterized by a
much slower approach to consensus than in the classic
voter model. When voters are partisan, their individual
preferences dominate over collectivism, and it is only by
exponentially rare events that consensus can ultimately
be achieved. These models offer a step toward the quan-
titative modeling of social phenomena, such as thresh-
old models of collectivism [10] and social experiments on
incentive-driven consensus formation [14]. Particularly
interesting behavior seems to arise when the two opin-
ion states are inequivalent; in this situation, partisanship
for the unfavorable state may prevent consensus to the
favorable state.
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